“Weapons of Mass Destruction” Again?

Iran and Its Quest for Nuclear Power

Evidence presented before the June 2025 and February 2026 strikes on Iran showed Iran possessed enriched uranium stocks near weapons-relevant levels and advanced centrifuge capability.  It is these facts that U.S. and allied officials used to argue Tehran was nearing a bomb threshold. Yet multiple expert analyses and intelligence assessments concluded there was no clear, corroborated evidence that Iran had decided to build a weapon or was operating a structured, ongoing weapons program immediately prior to the strikes (Fact Check, March 3, 2026; House of Commons Library, June 24, 2025).

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) documented that by mid‑2025, Iran had accumulated significant quantities of uranium enriched to 60 percent as a worrying short technical step toward weapons‑grade material. The IAEA‑estimated that Iran possessed roughly 440.9 kg of 60% uranium on the eve of the June 2025 strikes.  Other tallies also put the pre‑strike total in similar ranges (CBS, February 28, 2026; Center for Arms Control and Non-proliferation, March 16, 2026). Technical briefs emphasized that enrichment to 60 percent is “near” weapons levels.  With further technological development, Iran’s theoretical time for conversion to weapon’s grade product was less than the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiated under the Obama administration had allowed (Arms Association, March 2025).

On the other hand, U.S. intelligence assessments presented a mixed picture. Some U.S. sources warned of a covert team pursuing cruder, faster weapon designs and estimated reduced timelines for producing weapons grade materials. Formal judgments stopped short of saying Tehran had restarted a structured weapons program or made a political decision to weaponize (Congress.gov, March 6, 2026; Congress.gov May 24, 2025). The 2025 Worldwide Threat Assessment and later public analyses noted Iran had capabilities that could shorten the production timelines if a political decision were made.   However, these reports also stressed that Iran had not clearly undertaken all activities necessary to field test a device (Arms Control Association March 2026; Congress.gov May 24, 2025).

Non‑governmental experts and analytic centers publicly challenged claims that Iran was “very close” to a bomb, arguing that available evidence did not demonstrate active weaponization or an authoritative decision to build one.  Prominent analysts told reporters there was “no evidence that Iran was close to a nuclear weapon.”  These reports highlighted IAEA language which indicated a lack of credible signs of an ongoing weapons construction program (FactCheck.org, March 3, 2026; Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, March 11, 2026). Scientific and policy commentators cautioned that quantities of 60% material are serious but not proof that Iran had completed the work necessary to develop weapons grade materials.   The necessary developments for building a nuclear bomb include design, machining, and testing of various bomb components.  These steps are required to have a deliverable warhead (Center for Arms Control and Non-proliferation, March 16, 2026).

Still, the IAEA repeatedly flagged serious concerns over safeguards.   It documented high levels of enrichment and identified undeclared sites tied to past weaponization activities.  And, in mid‑2025, they formally found Iran in non‑compliance with safeguards obligations. Proponents of strikes used this information to argue an urgency to confront Iran.  On the other hand, the agency’s director later said it had no evidence of a structured current program to manufacture weapons (Quincy; House of Commons; Congress.gov; Center for Arms Control …).

U.S. and Israeli leaders framed the 2025 and 2026 bombings as pre‑emptive responses to an imminent threat, citing reduced breakout estimates from some intelligence elements, and the large 60% stockpile. Critics responded that public claims often lacked transparent underlying evidence, and that some senior intelligence officials and independent experts disputed the U.S. and Israeli assertions of immediacy. Independent reporters noted potential political incentives to emphasize worst‑case trajectories, and that open-source public reporting could not fully verify classified judgments.

In conclusion, an analysis of the pre‑war-strikes record supports a restrained conclusion. Iran had advanced technical capacity and sizeable near‑weapons‑grade material that could shorten breakout timelines under a political decision to weaponize.  However, authoritative public assessments and technical experts found no incontrovertible evidence that Iran had resumed or completed a structured program to build deliverable nuclear weapons immediately before the 2025–2026 strikes. The public record is thin! While there is classified operational intelligence and internal decision memos, claims of imminence by Israel and the U.S. relied on contested judgments rather than open, incontrovertible proof.