An Open Letter to the Congress of the United States

The following is an open letter to every Senator and member of the House of Representatives. I hope you take time to call, write, email or text your Congressional representatives.

I am a 78-year-old retired mid-level state administrator and professor emeritus from a Midwestern university. I was a respected member of the law enforcement and security community. I have testified before Congress on matters related to the regulation of the security industry, and am the author of a highly respected security book. More importantly, I have always been an independent voter, voting for the person, not the party.

I should not need to remind you that America was founded as a democratic, representative republic. While the right to vote has expanded over the past 250 years, the central principle remains the same: voters elect representatives to Congress to reflect the views and interests of their communities. That principle has been under attack since the early 1800s, when party affiliation increasingly became more about gaining control of government than responding to the electorate. Partisan politics has become institutionalized despite warnings from many of those founding fathers about the dangers of political factions. President Trump’s current demands for redistricting (gerrymandering) to increase Republican Party control of Congress was not part of the blueprint written by our founding fathers.

Today, partisan politics is driven not only by loyalty to a party, but by loyalty to a president. You were elected to represent your constituents, not your party, and certainly not any individual leader. For those of you who are Republicans, that responsibility should outweigh loyalty to President Trump or a gerrymandered district. There has always been tension over the direction this nation should take (e.g., state’s rights versus a strong federal government; slave versus free), but that tension has historically produced compromises that have allowed the country to prosper. Congress must return to a genuine exchange of ideas, and move away from rigid party loyalty and deference to presidential influence!

Consider the polls: President Trump is not leading the country in the direction he promised. The polls reflect the opinion of the people you were elected to represent. On the average among all polls, approximately 2/3 of those polled do not support President Trump (although 80% of Republicans continue to support him but perhaps not all his policies). Do your job by considering what your full range of constituents want and work with one another to improve the nation’s circumstances. A renewed reading of the Declaration of Independence might be worthwhile. Many of the grievances listed in that document may feel relevant to the way in which Donald Trump is leading America. He is ignoring laws, challenging judges, eliminating or limited established government agencies, establishing a paramilitary enforcement unit (ICE), and creating economic chaos with his tariffs. The grievances outlined in the Declaration of Independence serve as a formal indictment of King George III’s actions, which the American colonists viewed as tyrannical. The following are just a few of the key grievances they listed:

Dissolution of legislative bodies that opposed the king’s views.
Obstruction of justice by making judges dependent on his will
Imposition of a standing army
Transportation for trial by arresting and transporting those opposed to the King’s views to England.
Interference with trade, limiting economic freedom.
Forbidding governors to pass laws unless approved by the King.

For those of you who are truly serving your voters, I offer my respect and appreciation. To those who are beholden to financial or political interests rather than to the people who elected you, I urge you to recommit yourselves to public service or else step aside! If this representative democratic republic is to remain a beacon, you must represent those who elect you to Congress. If not, this 250-year experiment will be in serious jeopardy.

Robert James Fischer, PhD, Professor Emeritus

President, Assets Protection Associates, Inc.

Gerrymandering, a Tool of Political Organizations:

What Can Be Done to Eliminate It

What is Gerrymandering?

In simple terms gerrymandering is the process of drawing political boundaries that give a particular party an advantage over the opposing party. Gerrymandering is NOT something that our founding fathers foresaw. They envisioned a representative government that is proportional to the various views of its people. For example, if 60% of the population is from the Elephant Party and 40% are from the Donkey Party, then elected representatives should be in the same proportion.

The practice is named after Governor Elbridge Gerry, Massachusetts. In 1812 the governor, concerned over the growing strength of the Federalist Party, managed to pass a law that allowed for redistricting. The sole purpose of this legislation was to create voting districts that gave advantage to the Governor’s Democratic-Republicans. One of the districts was so distorted that Boston Gazette journalist Elkanah Tisdale labeled the salamander shaped district “The Gerry-mander.” This term has continued through to the present day.

Whatever their labels, both parties continued to use the practice to their advantage. The views of the people were eventually subjugated to the welfare of the party. Partisan politics has become more important than representing the people who are supposed to be represented.

In 1965, to make voting districts more representative of voter demographics, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that districts should reflect substantial equality of population. This measure was designed to overcome districts that might have been racially biased. However, many jurisdictions continued to create politically advantageous districts. While the Supreme Court has heard a number of cases regarding partisan gerrymandering, it has not established a clear standard. In 2018 the Court looked at cases in Texas, Wisconsin, North Carolina and Maryland. According to Steve Vladeck, University of Texas Law School professor, “The common thread in the court’s gerrymandering decisions this term (2018) has been to generally make it harder for plaintiffs to bring these claims, and to generally allow states more flexibility and deference in drawing congressional and state district lines.” The issue that clouds what is blatantly political is the Constitutional issue of “one person, one vote.” In the North Carolina case, Gill v. Whitford, where on a 9-0 vote, the Court determined that the plaintiffs failed to prove that “concrete and particularized” injury [racial bias] denied anyone the right to vote. (de Vogue, Ariane and Watkins, Eli, CNN, June 25, 2018).

A Simple Example

Let us consider a simple example of how gerrymandering works. Let us suppose that a state has a large minority population located in the northwest part of the state. The rest of the state is mixed race but heavily dominated by a white majority. The interests in the minority population lean toward a donkey party. In general, the rest of the state leans toward an elephant party. The districting as reflected by the 1975 U.S. Supreme Court ruling is fair. However, in a recent move to consolidate elephant power in the state, the majority elephant party decides to change the boundaries in the northwest portion of the state. They move the lines so that a portion of the minority population is moved into a district that is dominated by the elephant party. They, likewise, move a large portion of an elephant dominated district into the remaining donkey dominated minority district. In both cases, the old minority district’s donkey vote is diluted. The elephant party now controls the entire state. The process is exactly what has recently happened in Texas, Louisiana, and California. In many areas, the gerrymandered districts are extremely convoluted, appearing as thin wavy lines or distorted figures.

What should be done?

Is there a better way of defining voting districts other than Gerrymandering? There are several far better ways to design voting districts than the political gerrymander‑friendly system we use now. The most effective alternatives replace single‑member, winner‑take‑all districts with systems that either dilute the power of line‑drawing or eliminate district lines entirely.

Gerrymandering thrives because each district elects one representative. Winning requires only a plurality, not proportional support. Line‑drawing manufactures safe seats even in competitive states by drawing districts that minimize one parties voting numbers in favor of the other party.

Given the Supreme Court’s 1965 decision, jurisdictions need to be held accountable for their districting. This simple step would ensure that the vision of our founding fathers is restored. Today’s technology allows for computer programs that can create districts representative of population diversity. I fact, some state legislatures have tried other methods such as the following:

Advisory commissions – composed of non-legislators, appointed by legislators. This is an advisory body. The legislators retain redistricting powers.
Backup commissions—composed of non-legislators, appointed by legislators. This group provides input when an impasse on redistricting is apparent.
Politician commissions—composed of non-elected, but political officials.
Independent commissions– composed of non-legislators and non-public officials, generally prohibited from running for public office for a specified period after the completion of their term on the commission. This type of commission is viewed as being the most independent of political considerations.

The use of these non‑partisan or bipartisan bodies helps in that they remove direct self‑interest, increase transparency, and produce more compact and competitive districts.

However, any reform that keeps single‑member districts can reduce gerrymandering, but it can’t eliminate the incentive. This approach is still constrained by the single‑member district model. Commissions can be captured or influenced. And “Fairness” criteria can conflict (compactness vs. minority representation). States like California, Arizona, Michigan, and Colorado have adopted this approach. But as is evident from the recent California redistricting vote, it too can be manipulated.

Algorithmic or “Computational” Redistricting

Algorithmic Redistricting is an open‑source algorithm generated map based on neutral criteria (population equality, compactness, contiguity). It is transparent and reproducible, removes human bias, and allows courts to compare enacted maps to a neutral baseline.

However, as with all algorithms, the program simplyreflects the criteria chosen — and choosing criteria is political. In the end, there are still single‑member districts.

Multi‑Member Districts + Proportional Representation

The U.S. used multi‑member districts in various forms until the 1967 Uniform Congressional District Act (UCDA) mandated single‑member districts.

States are divided into larger districts electing 3–5 representatives each. Seats are allocated proportionally. Voters rank the candidates. The top vote talliers are elected. Gerrymandering becomes mathematically ineffective. Minority viewpoints get representation. It reduces polarization by rewarding coalition‑building. The system could easily be introduced, since Congress could repeal the 1967 Uniform Congressional District Act without a constitutional amendment.

This may be the most powerful anti‑gerrymandering reform.

Ranked‑Choice Voting (RCV)

Voters rank candidates; votes transfer until someone reaches a majority. This approach reduces the incentive to draw “safe” districts and encourages broader appeal. The system works especially well when paired with the multi‑member districts just discussed above. On its own, RCV doesn’t eliminate gerrymandering — but it softens its effects.

At‑Large or Statewide Proportional Representation

This systemeliminates districts entirely. The entire state votes as one district, and seats are allocated proportionally. Gerrymandering becomes impossible. Representation mirrors statewide vote share. This system might require federal statutory change due to the 1967 UCDA, in that it could weaken local geographic representation.

Hybrid Systems (Used in Germany, New Zealand, Japan)

Mixed‑Member Proportional: Voters cast two ballots: one for a district representative, one for a party.
Party seats are adjusted to ensure proportionality.

This system preserves local representation, ensures proportional outcomes, and makes gerrymandering largely irrelevant.

Which System Is Most Effective?

Multi‑member districts with proportional representation are the strongest reform. This is the model recommended by political scientists across the ideological spectrum and endorsed by the 2022 American Academy of Arts & Sciences report on democratic reform. Independent commissions are the most politically feasible. Multi‑member districts + PR are the most transformative and legally possible via congressional statute. Algorithmic redistricting is a strong intermediate step.

Conclusions

Gerrymandered districting was never about representing people; it was designed to give a political party control of the system. Many of our founding fathers warned against the formation of political parties. Loyalty to a party platform or leader ignores the fact that our system mandates that our elected officials represent their constituents, not their party. While common ideas may be used to form coalitions, the blind loyalty to a political party is the antithesis of what this country stands for. Multi-member districts with proportional representation, as recommended by political scientists, is a relatively easy fix, if only our elected representatives had the courage to enact appropriate legislation!

What is the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)?

The AIPAC is the largest and most influential pro-Israel lobby organization in the United States. This lobby’s total dollars invested in political influence dwarfs spending by most other lobby groups. AIPAC’s stated mission is to encourage and persuade the U.S. government to adopt policies that ensure a strong and lasting partnership with Israel. This includes lobbying for specific pro‑Israel policies, including security assistance, countering Iran, combating terrorism, and opposing anti‑Israel discrimination. The group also promotes cooperation in areas like cybersecurity, energy, agriculture, and water security.

The AIPAC spent over $100 million in the 2024 election (Federal Election Commission) to defeat candidates who were critical of Israel. This makes It was the biggest single-issue spender. In the 2024 cycle, 96% of AIPAC‑backed candidates won their general elections, demonstrating its influence. The AIPAC is the dominant pro-Israel lobby group in the United States, with direct contributions and other expenditures used to influence congressional races. Both Republicans and Democrats have received support from the group. In a 30-year period, key legislators have received millions of dollars. Former President Joe Biden benefited from over $4 million, Mitch McConnell and Ted Cruz received almost $2 million each. Chuck Schumer was the recipient of $1.3 million. While the AIPAC is not a direct donor, it legally operates the AIPAC PAC, as well as the super PAC, United Democracy.

How much does Congress appropriate for Israel each year? How much is for defense? Congress appropriates about $3.8 billion per year for Israel in normal (non‑emergency) funding, and virtually all of it is defense‑related ($3.3 billion on Foreign Military Financing (FMF)). The remaining $500 million is for the Israel missile defense program (Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow). Emergency supplementals have added several additional billions on top of the baseline.

Since the October 7, 2023 attacks, Congress has passed multiple emergency packages above the $3.8 billion baseline. For example, in FY 2024 Congress appropriated an addition FMF aid of $5.5 billion, $4 billion for the Iron Dome, and $1.2 billion for the new Iron Beam laser defense system. Also, while not dollars directly appropriated for Israel, the current Iran war has cost America over $30 billion dollars in military expenditures!

It is interesting to note that almost all the Israeli appropriated funds return to the United States. Under the 2016 U.S.- Israel Memorandum of Understanding, the FMF must be spent on U.S. defense goods and services. FMF grants must be spent on U.S.‑made military equipment, meaning the entire $3.3 billion FMF portion each year flows directly to U.S. defense contractors.

The missile‑defense funds (Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow) are joint U.S.–Israel programs, but a substantial share (approximately 13%) also goes to U.S. contractors. Iron Dome components are co‑produced in the U.S. Arrow and David’s Sling involve U.S. firms such as Boeing and Raytheon. While the exact percentage varies by program and year, most missile‑defense appropriations also return to U.S. industry through co‑production and joint development

So in practice, well over 85–90% of all U.S. aid to Israel is spent in the United States, not Israel. At this point it might be wise to remember President Eisenhower’s caution, “We must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the Military Industrial Complex.”

How does our support of Israel compare with that given to other allies? Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. aid since 2001, and its aid is uniquely structured to flow back to U.S. defense contractors. Other regional allies such as Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq receive less than $1.5 billion in general aid. Most is for general economic support programs, not military aid, about 50% of the aid for Israel. On must question, is it the United States’ role to be the major military supporter of Israel?

What differentiates Zionism from Judaism?

Zionism and Judaism differ at the most fundamental levels. Judaism is a religion and civilization, whereas Zionism is a modern political ideology. Judaism is an ancient monotheistic religion and an ethnocultural identity with laws, rituals, ethics, and a global diaspora community. Zionism is a 19th‑century political movement advocating Jewish national self‑determination in the historic land of Israel.

Judaism is a religious beliefin one God and the teachings of the Torah. Halachic law, rituals, holidays, and ethical obligations dominate the religion. Jewish people share a cultural and ethnicidentity that has evolved over millennia across many countries. Just like Christianity there are many diverse denominations (Orthodox, Conservative, Reformed, etc.) with differing interpretations.

Judaism is not inherently tied to any specific political program. A Jew can be religious, secular, anti‑Zionist, or Zionist. Judaism itself does not embrace a political ideology. On the other hand, Zionism first emerged in late‑19th‑century Europe as a nationalist ideology seeking a Jewish homeland in historic Palestine. It is a movement with multiple branches (labor, revisionist, religious, cultural), that eventually led to the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948.

Zionism is supported by Jews (religious or secular), non‑Jews, and people who see it as a political and cultural struggle. Under the current Israeli government, it is often seen as a security, and a homeland protection philosophy.

Why are the two often confused with each other? Is there an overlap? Yes, there is an overlap. The overlap comes from shared symbols (Jerusalem, the Land of Israel), the fact that 33% of American Jews are Zionists, and Israel’s role in the modern Jewish identity. Approximately 90% of American Jews support Israel’s right to exist. And while 33% self-report as Zionist, less than 25% support the current Netanyahu administration expansionist policies.

To avoid the confusion, it is important to remember that Judaism is a religious/cultural identity, while Zionism is political nationalism. This is why some Jewish groups protest with signs like “Zionism is not Judaism.” They are rejecting the idea that Jewish religious identity requires political Zionism.

The distinction matters because criticism of the Israeli government policy (Netanyahu) is not automatically antisemitic. Not all Jews are Zionists, and not all Zionists are Jews. And most importantly Judaism’s 3,000‑year religious tradition is not simply a modern political movement.

A summary of the JCPOA agreement: What Did President Trump Walk Away From?

On November 24, 2013, Iran and the United Nations Security Council (U.S., U.K., France, Russia, China, and Germany) signed an interim deal, the Joint Commission Plan of Action (JCPOA), to freeze parts of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for limited sanctions relief. The agreement was signed by all parties on January 20, 2014, following an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification of Iranian compliance. Through 2014 and early 2015, negotiations continued on additional nuclear limitations and the limiting of sanctions on Iran. A final agreement was reached in Vienna on 14 July 2015.

However, it was not until October 18, 2015, that the party signers began to implement the agreement. Iran reduced its Uranium enrichment capacity (production capability and enriched uranium stockpiles) while the U.S./EU began limiting sanctions. On January 16, 2016, the IAEA certified that Iran had met its initial obligations. The UN, EU, and U.S. nuclear-related sanctions were lifted. However, the U.S. labeling of Iran for supporting terrorism, human rights violations, and the continued development of ballistic missiles continued.

On May 8, 2018, less than two years later, following the change of administration (Obama to Trump), the U.S.withdrew from the JCPOA and reimposed sanctions. President Trump claimed the agreement was “bad” and that he would negotiate a new deal. Iran remained in the deal with other signatories but began to gradually reduce compliance. By early 2019 Iran exceeded limits on its enriched uranium stockpile, enrichment levels, and centrifuge use. Then in January 2020 (following the change in administration from Biden to back to Trump), Iran announced it would no longer observe operational limits set by the JCPOA. However, they agreed to continue cooperating with the IAEA.

Negotiations had resumed under the Biden administration. However, talks stalled repeatedly over sanctions relief, IAEA investigations, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps terrorism designation. Iran continued to enrich its uranium stockpile. The IAEA reported that monitoring access was being limited. Relying on Israeli intelligence and a few U.S. intelligence reports of splinter groups trying to speed up uranium enrichment capabilities, Isael and the U.S. attacked Iran’s nuclear sites. Following the Twelve-Day War between Israel and Iran, and the U.S. bombing of designated nuclear sites in October 2025, Iran announced the termination of the JCPOA. This ended the agreement and closed the UN Security Council’s nuclear file on Iran.

What went wrong? An agreement was reached for limiting Iran’s nuclear program to power generation monitored by the IAEA in 2015. Sanctions were lifted and Iran’s economy began to recover. The withdrawal of the U.S. from the agreement by President Trump in 2018, saw a return to increased distrust on the parts of Iran and the U.S. President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA because his administration believed the agreement was too lenient, failed to address Iran’s broader behavior, and provided economic benefits without permanently preventing Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons. The JCPOA agreement did not address Iran’s support for Islamic fundamental revolutionary groups. Iran continued to distrust the U.S., which was viewed by Iran as exploiting middle east interest.

The IAEA issued 11 consecutive verification reports (2016–2018) confirming that Iran was complying with the JCPOA. Director General Yukiya Amano publicly stated that the deal’s monitoring provisions were the most intrusive ever negotiated and that Iran was meeting its commitments. Incidentally, the IAEA is the single most authoritative technical body on nuclear compliance. Federica Mogherini, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, repeatedly said the JCPOA was “delivering” and “working,” emphasizing that Iran was in verified compliance. The United Kingdom, France, and Germany issued joint statements affirming that:Iran was complying with the agreement; the JCPOA was achieving its purpose; and the deal was essential for regional and global security. UN Secretary‑General António Guterres stated that the JCPOA was a “major achievement” and that Iran was complying with its nuclear commitments, urging all parties to preserve the agreement. To support Guterres, UN Security Council Reportsrepeatedly affirmed that the JCPOA was functioning as intended. Even the Israeli Security Establishment (not the Government), composed of Israeli intelligence and military officials publicly stated that the JCPOA was working to constrain Iran’s nuclear program, even if they disliked other aspects of the deal.

Independent Nuclear Experts from the Arms Control Association, Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the Brookings Institution published analyses concluding that the JCPOA was effective, verifiable, and significantly limiting Iran’s nuclear capabilities. These assessments were based on data, not political preference.

President Trump could not negotiate a “better deal!” Israeli and U.S. intelligence reports were likely biased, focusing on what the administrations wanted to hear. While Iran continues to be labeled a “bad actor,” the actions of Israel and the U.S. are rightfully questionable considering the evidence that the 2015 JCPOA was working!

“Weapons of Mass Destruction” Again?

Iran and Its Quest for Nuclear Power

Evidence presented before the June 2025 and February 2026 strikes on Iran showed Iran possessed enriched uranium stocks near weapons-relevant levels and advanced centrifuge capability. It is these facts that U.S. and allied officials used to argue Tehran was nearing a bomb threshold. Yet multiple expert analyses and intelligence assessments concluded there was no clear, corroborated evidence that Iran had decided to build a weapon or was operating a structured, ongoing weapons program immediately prior to the strikes (Fact Check, March 3, 2026; House of Commons Library, June 24, 2025).

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) documented that by mid‑2025, Iran had accumulated significant quantities of uranium enriched to 60 percent as a worrying short technical step toward weapons‑grade material. The IAEA‑estimated that Iran possessed roughly 440.9 kg of 60% uranium on the eve of the June 2025 strikes. Other tallies also put the pre‑strike total in similar ranges (CBS, February 28, 2026; Center for Arms Control and Non-proliferation, March 16, 2026). Technical briefs emphasized that enrichment to 60 percent is “near” weapons levels. With further technological development, Iran’s theoretical time for conversion to weapon’s grade product was less than the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiated under the Obama administration had allowed (Arms Association, March 2025).

On the other hand, U.S. intelligence assessments presented a mixed picture. Some U.S. sources warned of a covert team pursuing cruder, faster weapon designs and estimated reduced timelines for producing weapons grade materials. Formal judgments stopped short of saying Tehran had restarted a structured weapons program or made a political decision to weaponize (Congress.gov, March 6, 2026; Congress.gov May 24, 2025). The 2025 Worldwide Threat Assessment and later public analyses noted Iran had capabilities that could shorten the production timelines if a political decision were made. However, these reports also stressed that Iran had not clearly undertaken all activities necessary to field test a device (Arms Control Association March 2026; Congress.gov May 24, 2025).

Non‑governmental experts and analytic centers publicly challenged claims that Iran was “very close” to a bomb, arguing that available evidence did not demonstrate active weaponization or an authoritative decision to build one. Prominent analysts told reporters there was “no evidence that Iran was close to a nuclear weapon.” These reports highlighted IAEA language which indicated a lack of credible signs of an ongoing weapons construction program (FactCheck.org, March 3, 2026; Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, March 11, 2026). Scientific and policy commentators cautioned that quantities of 60% material are serious but not proof that Iran had completed the work necessary to develop weapons grade materials. The necessary developments for building a nuclear bomb include design, machining, and testing of various bomb components. These steps are required to have a deliverable warhead (Center for Arms Control and Non-proliferation, March 16, 2026).

Still, the IAEA repeatedly flagged serious concerns over safeguards. It documented high levels of enrichment and identified undeclared sites tied to past weaponization activities. And, in mid‑2025, they formally found Iran in non‑compliance with safeguards obligations. Proponents of strikes used this information to argue an urgency to confront Iran. On the other hand, the agency’s director later said it had no evidence of a structured current program to manufacture weapons (Quincy; House of Commons; Congress.gov; Center for Arms Control …).

U.S. and Israeli leaders framed the 2025 and 2026 bombings as pre‑emptive responses to an imminent threat, citing reduced breakout estimates from some intelligence elements, and the large 60% stockpile. Critics responded that public claims often lacked transparent underlying evidence, and that some senior intelligence officials and independent experts disputed the U.S. and Israeli assertions of immediacy. Independent reporters noted potential political incentives to emphasize worst‑case trajectories, and that open-source public reporting could not fully verify classified judgments.

In conclusion, an analysis of the pre‑war-strikes record supports a restrained conclusion. Iran had advanced technical capacity and sizeable near‑weapons‑grade material that could shorten breakout timelines under a political decision to weaponize. However, authoritative public assessments and technical experts found no incontrovertible evidence that Iran had resumed or completed a structured program to build deliverable nuclear weapons immediately before the 2025–2026 strikes. The public record is thin! While there is classified operational intelligence and internal decision memos, claims of imminence by Israel and the U.S. relied on contested judgments rather than open, incontrovertible proof.

A Brief History of Iran: A Country that Should be Blown Back to the Stone Ages?

Iran/Persia is one of the world’s oldest continuous civilizations, defined by powerful empires, religious transformation, and repeated cycles of conquest and renewal. The known history begins with the Elamite Civilization (c. 3200 BCE). This is one of the world’s earliest states with its own writing system and monumental architecture. In 2000 to 1000 BC, Iranian tribes arrived from Central Asia, bringing early forms of the Persian language and the religious ideas that would shape Zoroastrianism, a monotheistic ethical religion that became central to Persian identity.

In 550–330 BC, Cyrus the Greatunited the Persian tribes and founded the Achaemenid Empire, the world’s first “superpower,” that stretched from the Balkans to the Indus Valley. Cyrus is remembered for his policies of cultural and religious tolerance. Cyrus’s successor, Darius I, expanded and organized the empire, creating a standardized currency, roads, and administrative systems.

In 330 BC, the empire was conquered by Alexander the Great, who ushered in a period of Greek rule. Following the death of Alexander, other empires were established in the area. In 247 BC, a decentralized, cavalry‑based power developed that repeatedly clashed with Rome. By 224 BC, there was a revival of Persian culture, Zoroastrian religion, and centralized state power. They become a major rival to Rome/Byzantium.

In 627 AD, the empire weakened and collapsed under early Islamic conquests. Persia became part of the rapidly expanding Islamic world, but retained its language and cultural identity. A succession of dynasties shaped the region, blending Persian administration with Islamic governance. In 1501, Shi’ism was established as the state religion, a defining feature of Iranian identity to this day.

In the years 1789–1925, the Qajar Dynasty became entangled with European imperial pressure, with territorial losses to European interests and European forced internal reform. To survive, the ruling Pahlavi family, Reza Shah and later Mohammad Reza Shah, pursued rapid modernization, secularization, and centralization.

American involvement in Iran began not with geopolitics but with missionaries, educators, and physicians. In the 1800s, American missionaries established schools, hospitals, and Iran’s first modern medical college in Urmia. These institutions earned widespread respect among Iranians. The U.S. was viewed as a non‑imperial power, unlike Britain and Russia, who dominated Iran economically and militarily. Americans were even appointed as financial advisors to the Shah. This era is often remembered as the high point of U.S.–Iran goodwill.

Everything changed in August 1953, when the U.S. and Britain orchestrated an overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh after he nationalized Iran’s oil industry. The CIA-led coup restored the Shah’s authority and installed a more Western‑aligned government. For many Iranians, this became a foundational grievance. The U.S. was now seen as an imperial actor interfering in Iran’s sovereignty.

After the coup, the U.S. became the Shah’s primary supporter and Iran became one of America’s closest Cold War allies. The Shah’s regime, backed by U.S. military and intelligence aid, grew increasingly authoritarian. Many Iranians associated the U.S. with the Shah’s repression, widening the legitimacy gap that would fuel revolution.

The Shah was overthrown in 1979, and the Islamic Republic emerged. Iranian students seized the U.S. Embassy, holding 52 Americans hostage for 444 days. The U.S. severed diplomatic relations in 1980, and they have never been fully restored. The revolution reframed the U.S. as Iran’s primary external adversary, the “Great Satan!” Beginning in 1984, the U.S. labeled Iran a state sponsor of terrorism. This crisis cemented the mutual distrust that defines the relationship to this day.

The decades after the revolution saw cycles of hostility and missed opportunities. There were naval clashes during the Iran–Iraq War (including the U.S. shooting down Iran Air Flight 655 in 1988). There was Iran’s cooperation with the Taliban in 2001, followed by the “Axis of Evil” designation in 2002. And as we know today, there are the long‑running disputes over Iran’s nuclear program.

The 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA), under President Obama, briefly thawed relations, limiting Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. The U.S. withdrawal from the deal in 2018, under President Trump, reignited tensions. By 2025, U.S.–Iran relations had deteriorated further, culminating in open warfare and in 2026, Iranian restrictions on the Strait of Hormuz.

Iranian leaders continue to frame the U.S., the “Great Satan,” as an oppressive global power, seeking dominance and control of Middle Eastern resources. The U.S. policymakers cite Iran’s support for militant groups (Hama and Hezbollah) and regional destabilization. Both sides use the other as a political foil, reinforcing entrenched narratives. Are we now dealing with another flawed Iraq “Weapons of Mass Destruction” mistake?

Trump Claims that Democrats are the Enemy!

There is NO factual basis for saying that Democrats—or for that matter, any mainstream American political group—are “America’s enemy.” Trump’s claim is political rhetoric, not an evidence‑based assessment of national security threats. It reflects a pattern in which Donald Trump labels political opponents as internal enemies.

Democrats are a constitutionally recognized political party representing tens of millions of Americans. They participate in elections, hold office, and operate within the same constitutional framework as Republicans. Disagreement over policy is normal in a democracy. It does not make one side an “enemy.”

Trump has increasingly described political opponents as “the enemy from within,” even calling them more dangerous than foreign adversaries. This is a rhetorical strategy, not a factual assessment. It’s meant to mobilize supporters and delegitimize critics.

This kind of language serves several political functions. It creates an “us vs. them” narrative, and it frames politics as a battle between patriots and traitors rather than a difference of ideas. By calling investigators, journalists, or opponents “enemies,” Trump casts any scrutiny of his actions as sabotage. His allegations heighten polarization, encouraging supporters to see compromise as betrayal. This is not unique to Trump, but he uses the tactic much more aggressively and more frequently than most modern presidents.

Historically, labeling fellow Americans as “enemies” is a warning sign. Democracies weaken when political opponents are treated as existential threats rather than competitors within the same system. When a political leader labels a domestic opponent as an “enemy,” it’s rarely about literal national security. It’s about reframing politics as existential conflict rather than policy disagreement. Trump is mobilizing supporters by creating a sense of threat—stolen elections, criminal immigrants, nuclear threats, WOKE, and DEI. According to Trump, critics are bad actors, particularly the “fake” media. He implies that his actions are normal and those opposed are anti-American. Political scientists call this antagonistic populism—a style that divides the nation into “the people” and “the enemies of the people.”

This tactic isn’t new in American history. For example, McCarthyism labeled political opponents (Socialists/Communists) as internal threats. Nixon framed critics as part of a “silent war” against him. Trump’s version is more direct and more personal. The “enemy” is not an ideology or a faction—it’s the opposing party itself. And to him, Democrats do not represent the core values of Americans. Make America Great Again!

One thing that stands out in Trump’s post‑2025 communication style is how his political rhetoric has become part of his governing posture. In his first term, the boundary between campaign language and governing language was porous; now, it’s almost nonexistent. That’s why statements like “Democrats are the enemy” aren’t just rhetorical flourishes—they’re signals about how he intends to wield power. When he labels Democrats as enemies, it’s often paired with threats of executive action, or accusations of sabotage and claims that the opposition is illegitimate. That pairing is what turns rhetoric into a governing tool. It’s not just messaging—it’s groundwork for policy justification.

When a president frames one party as an “enemy,” institutions that try to act independently get pulled into the conflict. They’re either “with him,” or “with the enemy.” That binary framing is powerful because it pressures institutions to choose sides. Consider the Supreme Court immunity debates or the almost blind loyalty of Congressional Republicans.

The more he escalates the language, the more his supporters expect confrontation. And the more they expect confrontation, the more he escalates. This loop is part of why his rhetoric has grown sharper since returning to office.

When setbacks occur—legal, bureaucratic, or geopolitical—he can immediately attribute them to “the enemy,” which protects his image of dominance, reframes failures as sabotage, and keeps his narrative intact. For example, Trump tried to bully a New York Times reporter. Donald Trump attacked NYT chief Washington correspondent David Sanger when he reported that Trump was backing away from his own goals in Iran, using Trump’s own words to prove it. Trump lashed out, “NYT’s lightweight analyst, David Sanger, says that I haven’t met my own goals. Yes, I have, and weeks ahead of schedule!” The Times could have let it slide. But they saw the pattern. It builds, and builds… until journalists lose all credibility. And they decided to break it.

Charlie Stadtlander, ED of Communications responded. “David Sanger brings more than 40 years of experience as a foreign and Washington correspondent for The Times — and a reputation for non-partisanship — to his work. His piece is a fair and thorough analysis of what the US military and American diplomats have and have not accomplished so far, and helps the country understand the state of the war and the president’s choices going forward. It’s exactly the type of analysis an independent journalist is supposed to be doing.”

Trump had an opportunity to respond. He didn’t. THIS is how you do it. Bullies only win when people give in. The New York Times did not give in! American need to support every news organization that stands up to Trump’s attacks on journalists. Demand the truth.

Funding Homeland Security: What’s the Problem?

Democrats have made it clear that they wish to fund Homeland Security programs but not Customs Border Patrol (CBP) or Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE). Democrats have made multiple attempts—at least four distinct legislative pushes in early 2026—to fund most Homeland Security programs while excluding ICE and CBP, but every attempt was blocked by Republicans. These efforts centered on funding Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Coast Guard, and other Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components while holding back ICE/CBP funding until reforms were negotiated.

For example, House Appropriations Committee Ranking Member Rosa DeLauro (D-Conn) introduced a Funding Bill (February 11, 2026) which would have provided a full‑year of DHS funding covering every agency except ICE, CBP, and the Secretary’s office. The billExplicitly withheld all ICE/CBP funding until reforms were enacted. While it passed the House, the Senate voted 51- 46 against the measure. However, Senate Majority Leader John Thune voted “no” for procedural reasons, which allows him to bring the motion back up at a later date.

Senator Patty Murray (D-WA), Vice Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee (March 6, 2026), said “This isn’t complicated: if Republicans won’t agree to rein in ICE and Border Patrol, they should at minimum work with us to pay TSA agents and fund disaster relief. But they won’t. Right now, Republicans are holding TSA agents’ paychecks hostage because they want to provide more money to ICE, without basic reforms to protect Americans’ rights and safety. Democrats will keep fighting to get TSA workers paid and fund FEMA and the Coast Guard, and we’ll keep pushing to enact common-sense steps to prevent more Americans from being hurt, or even killed, by masked federal agents.” Murray sought to fund TSA, FEMA, CISA, Coast Guard, and other DHS agencies, but explicitly excluded ICE and CBP. The request was blocked by Sen. Katie Britt (R‑AL).

Senator Tim Kaine (D-Virgina) later made a public push for partial DHS funding (March 8, 2026) where democrats proposed passing funding for four DHS agencies (TSA, FEMA, Coast Guard, CISA) while continuing reform negotiations for ICE and CBP. Republicans rejected these partial‑funding attempts.

Senator Patty Murray again pushed her modified bill funding TSA, Coast Guard, and FEMA while excluding ICE and the Secretary’s office (March 2026). Again,Republicans blocked it.

Democrats argued that ICE and CBP already had sufficient funding from the previous summer. After incidents in various cities including Los Angeles, Portland, Chicago, Minneapolis, Democrats believe that reforms are needed for judicial warrants, body cameras, bans on masks, limits on roving patrols, better training, etc., before additional funding is a given.

Why did Republicans block the efforts to fund all the other agencies in the Homeland Security Bill as offered by Democrats? The Republicans framed Democrat actions as attempts to “defund” immigration enforcement and refused to allow partial DHS funding. This is a political move aimed at making the Democrats the bad actors, keeping funding from TSA workers, and other needed service agencies. The actions of Representative DeLauro, Senators Murray and Kaine make this narrative false. Democrats believe in supporting all DHS initiatives except for CBP and ICE. Senate Majority Leader Thune knows this. That is why he cast his “no” for allowing him to bring the bill back for a future vote. It is time he did so! Republican Senators need to focus on the good of the people and less on political maneuvers!

Donald Trump’s Promises Regarding Foreign Entanglements and War: Long Term Implications

The Promises

Across his 2016, 2020, and 2024 campaigns, Trump repeatedly promised to avoid new foreign wars, especially in the Middle East. He also promised to end “forever wars” begun by previous administrations. He pledged to reduce U.S. involvement in conflicts where allies “don’t appreciate what we are doing” or don’t “reimburse” the U.S. for security commitments. And lastly, he promised to pursue an “America First” foreign policy focused on domestic priorities rather than global policing. This message was central to his political identity.

Trump’s “no more endless wars/America First” promises aren’t new in spirit—but they collide with a long post‑1945 habit of deep global engagement. George Washington warned against “permanent alliances” and Jefferson favored staying out of European wars—what was later called isolationism or non‑interventionism. Trump’s position sits squarely in that older tradition of suspicion toward foreign commitments and wars that don’t clearly defend the homeland. In terms of rhetoric, Trump is tapping a very old American belief. Don’t get dragged into other people’s fights.

Historically, from 1945 on, a dominant pattern emerges. The US builds NATO, stations troops abroad, fights in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and intervenes repeatedly in Latin America and the Middle East—often as “leader of the free world” or to contain communism/terrorism. The policy becomes active interventionism plus alliances, not Washington‑style distance. Measured against that 75‑year pattern, Trump’s promises were counter‑cultural. He questioned alliances, criticized past wars, and framed global leadership as a bad deal for Americans.

During his first term, Trump emphasized that he had not started any new wars, and he used this as a major selling point in the 2024 campaign. His running mate, JD Vance, framed Trump as the rare modern president who resisted pressure to initiate new conflicts. He also promised to withdraw troops from Syria and Afghanistan, and to avoid deploying U.S. forces unless the U.S. was directly threatened. His promise was to shift responsibility to regional actors saying, “Time for others to finally fight.”

Trump frequently criticized the Iraq War, calling it a “big, fat mistake.” He also criticized the U.S. role as “policeman of the Middle East,” and criticized the presidents who “threw America into unwise wars and failed to win them.” He framed Middle Eastern conflicts as costly, unproductive, and driven by the establishment.

Still, while promising to avoid new wars, Trump consistently said that Iran must never obtain a nuclear weapon. He also believed that the U.S. must confront Iran’s regional influence and proxy forces. This was the one area where his anti‑intervention rhetoric included a clear exception.

The Actions

Despite his promises to avoid new foreign wars and to keep America First, President Trump used a drone strike to kill General Soleimani of the Iran Revolutionary Guard Quds Force. He bombed nuclear processing sites in Iran. He has carried out a military strike in Venezuela to capture Nicolás Maduro. The attack followed 42 attacks targeting boats in the Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean. Then there was the public consideration of a “friendly takeover” of Cuba. And over a week ago he started a major war in Iran, launched without congressional authorization. These actions contrast sharply with his earlier pledges to avoid foreign entanglements. On March 10^th he also reiterated the importance of Greenland and Panama to America’s economic security and stated that military action to acquire these countries was NOT off the table.

Trump now argues that Iran posed a direct and imminent threat to the U.S. He believed that the U.S. needed to degrade Iran’s missiles, navy, nuclear capacity, and proxy networks. He stated that the operation could last far longer than initially projected. He recently said he does not subscribe to the “no boots on the ground” promises of past presidents. This marks a major rhetorical shift from ending wars to justifying new ones as necessary for national security. Most presidents, even when cautious about war, treat alliances as strategic assets. Trump treats them as suspect unless they show immediate, measurable benefit.

The Financial Costs

The Iran war is already costing U.S. taxpayers billions—roughly $3.7 billion in the first 100 hours and more than $5 billion in the first week— and as of this writing a reported $11 billion total with the end still not in sight. Daily operating costs were estimated at $891.4 million during the opening phase. That includes $18 million per day just to keep two carrier strike groups on station—before firing a single weapon. Munition replacement for Tomahawks, JASSM-ER, bunker busters, etc. costs $3.1 billion. Additional costs are associated with replacement of lost units or their repair. The sad thing is that those dollars could fund major domestic priorities if redirected under an “America First” framework.

What Those Dollars Could Support in an America First Strategy

Here’s what $5 billion (the first week of war) could fund domestically.

It could fund 2–3 major semiconductor fabrication incentives (CHIPS‑style grants). It could be used to rebuild critical supply chains for pharmaceuticals, rare‑earth processing, and defense components. Or there would be dollars to modernize U.S. steel and heavy‑industry plants to reduce reliance on China.
It could have been used to repair or replace 2,000+ rural bridges nationwide, or to upgrade freight rail and river ports critical to Midwest agriculture. There would have been dollars to modernize water systems in small towns like those across western Illinois.
This money would have fully funded VA staffing shortages for mental health and primary care. It could allow for expanded housing vouchers for homeless veterans (tens of thousands served).
The money could support universal school lunch for millions of children for an entire year. It could fund 40,000–50,000 new childcare slots in working‑class communities. It might be possible to rebuild aging public schools in rural districts.

The America First argument is simple. Every billion dollars spent on a foreign war is a billion not spent on domestic security, industry, and community stability. And that’s before considering the possibility of months of continued operations, which could push total costs into the tens of billions.

Hidden Costs to Non‑Belligerent Countries in the Iran War

Even nations far from the battlefield are paying a price. These costs emerge through energy markets, supply chains, financial volatility, and geopolitical realignments. Even countries with no stake in the conflict face higher fuel, electricity, and manufacturing costs. Twenty to 25% of global seaborne oil and one‑fifth of liquid national gas (LNG) move through the Strait of Hormuz. Disruptions in this route immediately raise global prices. Crude jumped from $70 to over $110 within days of the strikes. Gasoline costs have increased worldwide, resulting in higher transportation and food prices, increased fertilizer costs (due to disrupted ammonia/nitrogen exports), and slower economic growth in energy‑importing nations (Europe, India, Japan)

The Middle East supplies more than oil. Qatar produces40% of the world’s helium, essential for semiconductor manufacturing. Nitrogen and ammonia exports (vital for fertilizers) face delays. Even countries not involved militarily, experience stock market declines (e.g., the Dow fell 400+ points after the strikes), tighter global financial conditions, and capital flight from emerging markets into “safe havens.” Airspace closures across the Gulf grounded thousands of flights. These closures result in higher air cargo costs for global supply chains, and tourism declines for countries dependent on Middle Eastern travelers. At least fourteen freight ships have been attacked in the Strait of Hormuz since the start of the War. Shipping times have increased, freight rates have risen, and insurance premiums have spiked. Countries not involved in the war still face pressure to take sides. This has strained relations with major powers (e.g., EU, China), increased defense spending to hedge against regional instability, and resulted in domestic political polarization over foreign policy alignment

Iran and its proxies have retaliated. There have been alleged Increases in cyberattacks on global banks, infrastructure, and government systems. There is a heightened terrorism alert, resulting in more resources diverted to intelligence and counterterrorism. Terrorist attacks at Old Dominion, a Michigan synagogue, and the theft of four drones may just be the beginning.

Even countries with no troops, no bases, and no direct involvement in the Iran war are paying a price—through higher energy costs, disrupted supply chains, financial instability, and geopolitical pressure. These hidden costs accumulate quietly, but can reshape national budgets, inflation rates, and political landscapes worldwide.

Conclusion

Considering the above discussion, is the cost associated with the Iran War worth the intended result, whatever that goal may be? What about America First? Shouldn’t the money spent on the Iran War be used to support the America First initiative?