A summary of the JCPOA agreement: What Did President Trump Walk Away From?

On November 24, 2013, Iran and the United Nations Security Council (U.S., U.K., France, Russia, China, and Germany) signed an interim deal, the Joint Commission Plan of Action (JCPOA), to freeze parts of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for limited sanctions relief. The agreement was signed by all parties on January 20, 2014, following an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification of Iranian compliance. Through 2014 and early 2015, negotiations continued on additional nuclear limitations and the limiting of sanctions on Iran. A final agreement was reached in Vienna on 14 July 2015.

However, it was not until October 18, 2015, that the party signers began to implement the agreement. Iran reduced its Uranium enrichment capacity (production capability and enriched uranium stockpiles) while the U.S./EU began limiting sanctions. On January 16, 2016, the IAEA certified that Iran had met its initial obligations. The UN, EU, and U.S. nuclear-related sanctions were lifted. However, the U.S. labeling of Iran for supporting terrorism, human rights violations, and the continued development of ballistic missiles continued.

On May 8, 2018, less than two years later, following the change of administration (Obama to Trump), the U.S.withdrew from the JCPOA and reimposed sanctions. President Trump claimed the agreement was “bad” and that he would negotiate a new deal. Iran remained in the deal with other signatories but began to gradually reduce compliance. By early 2019 Iran exceeded limits on its enriched uranium stockpile, enrichment levels, and centrifuge use. Then in January 2020 (following the change in administration from Biden to back to Trump), Iran announced it would no longer observe operational limits set by the JCPOA. However, they agreed to continue cooperating with the IAEA.

Negotiations had resumed under the Biden administration. However, talks stalled repeatedly over sanctions relief, IAEA investigations, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps terrorism designation. Iran continued to enrich its uranium stockpile. The IAEA reported that monitoring access was being limited. Relying on Israeli intelligence and a few U.S. intelligence reports of splinter groups trying to speed up uranium enrichment capabilities, Isael and the U.S. attacked Iran’s nuclear sites. Following the Twelve-Day War between Israel and Iran, and the U.S. bombing of designated nuclear sites in October 2025, Iran announced the termination of the JCPOA. This ended the agreement and closed the UN Security Council’s nuclear file on Iran.

What went wrong? An agreement was reached for limiting Iran’s nuclear program to power generation monitored by the IAEA in 2015. Sanctions were lifted and Iran’s economy began to recover. The withdrawal of the U.S. from the agreement by President Trump in 2018, saw a return to increased distrust on the parts of Iran and the U.S. President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA because his administration believed the agreement was too lenient, failed to address Iran’s broader behavior, and provided economic benefits without permanently preventing Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons. The JCPOA agreement did not address Iran’s support for Islamic fundamental revolutionary groups. Iran continued to distrust the U.S., which was viewed by Iran as exploiting middle east interest.

The IAEA issued 11 consecutive verification reports (2016–2018) confirming that Iran was complying with the JCPOA. Director General Yukiya Amano publicly stated that the deal’s monitoring provisions were the most intrusive ever negotiated and that Iran was meeting its commitments. Incidentally, the IAEA is the single most authoritative technical body on nuclear compliance. Federica Mogherini, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, repeatedly said the JCPOA was “delivering” and “working,” emphasizing that Iran was in verified compliance. The United Kingdom, France, and Germany issued joint statements affirming that:Iran was complying with the agreement; the JCPOA was achieving its purpose; and the deal was essential for regional and global security. UN Secretary‑General António Guterres stated that the JCPOA was a “major achievement” and that Iran was complying with its nuclear commitments, urging all parties to preserve the agreement. To support Guterres, UN Security Council Reportsrepeatedly affirmed that the JCPOA was functioning as intended. Even the Israeli Security Establishment (not the Government), composed of Israeli intelligence and military officials publicly stated that the JCPOA was working to constrain Iran’s nuclear program, even if they disliked other aspects of the deal.

Independent Nuclear Experts from the Arms Control Association, Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the Brookings Institution published analyses concluding that the JCPOA was effective, verifiable, and significantly limiting Iran’s nuclear capabilities. These assessments were based on data, not political preference.

President Trump could not negotiate a “better deal!” Israeli and U.S. intelligence reports were likely biased, focusing on what the administrations wanted to hear. While Iran continues to be labeled a “bad actor,” the actions of Israel and the U.S. are rightfully questionable considering the evidence that the 2015 JCPOA was working!

“Weapons of Mass Destruction” Again?

Iran and Its Quest for Nuclear Power

Evidence presented before the June 2025 and February 2026 strikes on Iran showed Iran possessed enriched uranium stocks near weapons-relevant levels and advanced centrifuge capability. It is these facts that U.S. and allied officials used to argue Tehran was nearing a bomb threshold. Yet multiple expert analyses and intelligence assessments concluded there was no clear, corroborated evidence that Iran had decided to build a weapon or was operating a structured, ongoing weapons program immediately prior to the strikes (Fact Check, March 3, 2026; House of Commons Library, June 24, 2025).

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) documented that by mid‑2025, Iran had accumulated significant quantities of uranium enriched to 60 percent as a worrying short technical step toward weapons‑grade material. The IAEA‑estimated that Iran possessed roughly 440.9 kg of 60% uranium on the eve of the June 2025 strikes. Other tallies also put the pre‑strike total in similar ranges (CBS, February 28, 2026; Center for Arms Control and Non-proliferation, March 16, 2026). Technical briefs emphasized that enrichment to 60 percent is “near” weapons levels. With further technological development, Iran’s theoretical time for conversion to weapon’s grade product was less than the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiated under the Obama administration had allowed (Arms Association, March 2025).

On the other hand, U.S. intelligence assessments presented a mixed picture. Some U.S. sources warned of a covert team pursuing cruder, faster weapon designs and estimated reduced timelines for producing weapons grade materials. Formal judgments stopped short of saying Tehran had restarted a structured weapons program or made a political decision to weaponize (Congress.gov, March 6, 2026; Congress.gov May 24, 2025). The 2025 Worldwide Threat Assessment and later public analyses noted Iran had capabilities that could shorten the production timelines if a political decision were made. However, these reports also stressed that Iran had not clearly undertaken all activities necessary to field test a device (Arms Control Association March 2026; Congress.gov May 24, 2025).

Non‑governmental experts and analytic centers publicly challenged claims that Iran was “very close” to a bomb, arguing that available evidence did not demonstrate active weaponization or an authoritative decision to build one. Prominent analysts told reporters there was “no evidence that Iran was close to a nuclear weapon.” These reports highlighted IAEA language which indicated a lack of credible signs of an ongoing weapons construction program (FactCheck.org, March 3, 2026; Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, March 11, 2026). Scientific and policy commentators cautioned that quantities of 60% material are serious but not proof that Iran had completed the work necessary to develop weapons grade materials. The necessary developments for building a nuclear bomb include design, machining, and testing of various bomb components. These steps are required to have a deliverable warhead (Center for Arms Control and Non-proliferation, March 16, 2026).

Still, the IAEA repeatedly flagged serious concerns over safeguards. It documented high levels of enrichment and identified undeclared sites tied to past weaponization activities. And, in mid‑2025, they formally found Iran in non‑compliance with safeguards obligations. Proponents of strikes used this information to argue an urgency to confront Iran. On the other hand, the agency’s director later said it had no evidence of a structured current program to manufacture weapons (Quincy; House of Commons; Congress.gov; Center for Arms Control …).

U.S. and Israeli leaders framed the 2025 and 2026 bombings as pre‑emptive responses to an imminent threat, citing reduced breakout estimates from some intelligence elements, and the large 60% stockpile. Critics responded that public claims often lacked transparent underlying evidence, and that some senior intelligence officials and independent experts disputed the U.S. and Israeli assertions of immediacy. Independent reporters noted potential political incentives to emphasize worst‑case trajectories, and that open-source public reporting could not fully verify classified judgments.

In conclusion, an analysis of the pre‑war-strikes record supports a restrained conclusion. Iran had advanced technical capacity and sizeable near‑weapons‑grade material that could shorten breakout timelines under a political decision to weaponize. However, authoritative public assessments and technical experts found no incontrovertible evidence that Iran had resumed or completed a structured program to build deliverable nuclear weapons immediately before the 2025–2026 strikes. The public record is thin! While there is classified operational intelligence and internal decision memos, claims of imminence by Israel and the U.S. relied on contested judgments rather than open, incontrovertible proof.

A Brief History of Iran: A Country that Should be Blown Back to the Stone Ages?

Iran/Persia is one of the world’s oldest continuous civilizations, defined by powerful empires, religious transformation, and repeated cycles of conquest and renewal. The known history begins with the Elamite Civilization (c. 3200 BCE). This is one of the world’s earliest states with its own writing system and monumental architecture. In 2000 to 1000 BC, Iranian tribes arrived from Central Asia, bringing early forms of the Persian language and the religious ideas that would shape Zoroastrianism, a monotheistic ethical religion that became central to Persian identity.

In 550–330 BC, Cyrus the Greatunited the Persian tribes and founded the Achaemenid Empire, the world’s first “superpower,” that stretched from the Balkans to the Indus Valley. Cyrus is remembered for his policies of cultural and religious tolerance. Cyrus’s successor, Darius I, expanded and organized the empire, creating a standardized currency, roads, and administrative systems.

In 330 BC, the empire was conquered by Alexander the Great, who ushered in a period of Greek rule. Following the death of Alexander, other empires were established in the area. In 247 BC, a decentralized, cavalry‑based power developed that repeatedly clashed with Rome. By 224 BC, there was a revival of Persian culture, Zoroastrian religion, and centralized state power. They become a major rival to Rome/Byzantium.

In 627 AD, the empire weakened and collapsed under early Islamic conquests. Persia became part of the rapidly expanding Islamic world, but retained its language and cultural identity. A succession of dynasties shaped the region, blending Persian administration with Islamic governance. In 1501, Shi’ism was established as the state religion, a defining feature of Iranian identity to this day.

In the years 1789–1925, the Qajar Dynasty became entangled with European imperial pressure, with territorial losses to European interests and European forced internal reform. To survive, the ruling Pahlavi family, Reza Shah and later Mohammad Reza Shah, pursued rapid modernization, secularization, and centralization.

American involvement in Iran began not with geopolitics but with missionaries, educators, and physicians. In the 1800s, American missionaries established schools, hospitals, and Iran’s first modern medical college in Urmia. These institutions earned widespread respect among Iranians. The U.S. was viewed as a non‑imperial power, unlike Britain and Russia, who dominated Iran economically and militarily. Americans were even appointed as financial advisors to the Shah. This era is often remembered as the high point of U.S.–Iran goodwill.

Everything changed in August 1953, when the U.S. and Britain orchestrated an overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh after he nationalized Iran’s oil industry. The CIA-led coup restored the Shah’s authority and installed a more Western‑aligned government. For many Iranians, this became a foundational grievance. The U.S. was now seen as an imperial actor interfering in Iran’s sovereignty.

After the coup, the U.S. became the Shah’s primary supporter and Iran became one of America’s closest Cold War allies. The Shah’s regime, backed by U.S. military and intelligence aid, grew increasingly authoritarian. Many Iranians associated the U.S. with the Shah’s repression, widening the legitimacy gap that would fuel revolution.

The Shah was overthrown in 1979, and the Islamic Republic emerged. Iranian students seized the U.S. Embassy, holding 52 Americans hostage for 444 days. The U.S. severed diplomatic relations in 1980, and they have never been fully restored. The revolution reframed the U.S. as Iran’s primary external adversary, the “Great Satan!” Beginning in 1984, the U.S. labeled Iran a state sponsor of terrorism. This crisis cemented the mutual distrust that defines the relationship to this day.

The decades after the revolution saw cycles of hostility and missed opportunities. There were naval clashes during the Iran–Iraq War (including the U.S. shooting down Iran Air Flight 655 in 1988). There was Iran’s cooperation with the Taliban in 2001, followed by the “Axis of Evil” designation in 2002. And as we know today, there are the long‑running disputes over Iran’s nuclear program.

The 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA), under President Obama, briefly thawed relations, limiting Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. The U.S. withdrawal from the deal in 2018, under President Trump, reignited tensions. By 2025, U.S.–Iran relations had deteriorated further, culminating in open warfare and in 2026, Iranian restrictions on the Strait of Hormuz.

Iranian leaders continue to frame the U.S., the “Great Satan,” as an oppressive global power, seeking dominance and control of Middle Eastern resources. The U.S. policymakers cite Iran’s support for militant groups (Hama and Hezbollah) and regional destabilization. Both sides use the other as a political foil, reinforcing entrenched narratives. Are we now dealing with another flawed Iraq “Weapons of Mass Destruction” mistake?

Donald Trump’s Promises Regarding Foreign Entanglements and War: Long Term Implications

The Promises

Across his 2016, 2020, and 2024 campaigns, Trump repeatedly promised to avoid new foreign wars, especially in the Middle East. He also promised to end “forever wars” begun by previous administrations. He pledged to reduce U.S. involvement in conflicts where allies “don’t appreciate what we are doing” or don’t “reimburse” the U.S. for security commitments. And lastly, he promised to pursue an “America First” foreign policy focused on domestic priorities rather than global policing. This message was central to his political identity.

Trump’s “no more endless wars/America First” promises aren’t new in spirit—but they collide with a long post‑1945 habit of deep global engagement. George Washington warned against “permanent alliances” and Jefferson favored staying out of European wars—what was later called isolationism or non‑interventionism. Trump’s position sits squarely in that older tradition of suspicion toward foreign commitments and wars that don’t clearly defend the homeland. In terms of rhetoric, Trump is tapping a very old American belief. Don’t get dragged into other people’s fights.

Historically, from 1945 on, a dominant pattern emerges. The US builds NATO, stations troops abroad, fights in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and intervenes repeatedly in Latin America and the Middle East—often as “leader of the free world” or to contain communism/terrorism. The policy becomes active interventionism plus alliances, not Washington‑style distance. Measured against that 75‑year pattern, Trump’s promises were counter‑cultural. He questioned alliances, criticized past wars, and framed global leadership as a bad deal for Americans.

During his first term, Trump emphasized that he had not started any new wars, and he used this as a major selling point in the 2024 campaign. His running mate, JD Vance, framed Trump as the rare modern president who resisted pressure to initiate new conflicts. He also promised to withdraw troops from Syria and Afghanistan, and to avoid deploying U.S. forces unless the U.S. was directly threatened. His promise was to shift responsibility to regional actors saying, “Time for others to finally fight.”

Trump frequently criticized the Iraq War, calling it a “big, fat mistake.” He also criticized the U.S. role as “policeman of the Middle East,” and criticized the presidents who “threw America into unwise wars and failed to win them.” He framed Middle Eastern conflicts as costly, unproductive, and driven by the establishment.

Still, while promising to avoid new wars, Trump consistently said that Iran must never obtain a nuclear weapon. He also believed that the U.S. must confront Iran’s regional influence and proxy forces. This was the one area where his anti‑intervention rhetoric included a clear exception.

The Actions

Despite his promises to avoid new foreign wars and to keep America First, President Trump used a drone strike to kill General Soleimani of the Iran Revolutionary Guard Quds Force. He bombed nuclear processing sites in Iran. He has carried out a military strike in Venezuela to capture Nicolás Maduro. The attack followed 42 attacks targeting boats in the Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean. Then there was the public consideration of a “friendly takeover” of Cuba. And over a week ago he started a major war in Iran, launched without congressional authorization. These actions contrast sharply with his earlier pledges to avoid foreign entanglements. On March 10^th he also reiterated the importance of Greenland and Panama to America’s economic security and stated that military action to acquire these countries was NOT off the table.

Trump now argues that Iran posed a direct and imminent threat to the U.S. He believed that the U.S. needed to degrade Iran’s missiles, navy, nuclear capacity, and proxy networks. He stated that the operation could last far longer than initially projected. He recently said he does not subscribe to the “no boots on the ground” promises of past presidents. This marks a major rhetorical shift from ending wars to justifying new ones as necessary for national security. Most presidents, even when cautious about war, treat alliances as strategic assets. Trump treats them as suspect unless they show immediate, measurable benefit.

The Financial Costs

The Iran war is already costing U.S. taxpayers billions—roughly $3.7 billion in the first 100 hours and more than $5 billion in the first week— and as of this writing a reported $11 billion total with the end still not in sight. Daily operating costs were estimated at $891.4 million during the opening phase. That includes $18 million per day just to keep two carrier strike groups on station—before firing a single weapon. Munition replacement for Tomahawks, JASSM-ER, bunker busters, etc. costs $3.1 billion. Additional costs are associated with replacement of lost units or their repair. The sad thing is that those dollars could fund major domestic priorities if redirected under an “America First” framework.

What Those Dollars Could Support in an America First Strategy

Here’s what $5 billion (the first week of war) could fund domestically.

It could fund 2–3 major semiconductor fabrication incentives (CHIPS‑style grants). It could be used to rebuild critical supply chains for pharmaceuticals, rare‑earth processing, and defense components. Or there would be dollars to modernize U.S. steel and heavy‑industry plants to reduce reliance on China.
It could have been used to repair or replace 2,000+ rural bridges nationwide, or to upgrade freight rail and river ports critical to Midwest agriculture. There would have been dollars to modernize water systems in small towns like those across western Illinois.
This money would have fully funded VA staffing shortages for mental health and primary care. It could allow for expanded housing vouchers for homeless veterans (tens of thousands served).
The money could support universal school lunch for millions of children for an entire year. It could fund 40,000–50,000 new childcare slots in working‑class communities. It might be possible to rebuild aging public schools in rural districts.

The America First argument is simple. Every billion dollars spent on a foreign war is a billion not spent on domestic security, industry, and community stability. And that’s before considering the possibility of months of continued operations, which could push total costs into the tens of billions.

Hidden Costs to Non‑Belligerent Countries in the Iran War

Even nations far from the battlefield are paying a price. These costs emerge through energy markets, supply chains, financial volatility, and geopolitical realignments. Even countries with no stake in the conflict face higher fuel, electricity, and manufacturing costs. Twenty to 25% of global seaborne oil and one‑fifth of liquid national gas (LNG) move through the Strait of Hormuz. Disruptions in this route immediately raise global prices. Crude jumped from $70 to over $110 within days of the strikes. Gasoline costs have increased worldwide, resulting in higher transportation and food prices, increased fertilizer costs (due to disrupted ammonia/nitrogen exports), and slower economic growth in energy‑importing nations (Europe, India, Japan)

The Middle East supplies more than oil. Qatar produces40% of the world’s helium, essential for semiconductor manufacturing. Nitrogen and ammonia exports (vital for fertilizers) face delays. Even countries not involved militarily, experience stock market declines (e.g., the Dow fell 400+ points after the strikes), tighter global financial conditions, and capital flight from emerging markets into “safe havens.” Airspace closures across the Gulf grounded thousands of flights. These closures result in higher air cargo costs for global supply chains, and tourism declines for countries dependent on Middle Eastern travelers. At least fourteen freight ships have been attacked in the Strait of Hormuz since the start of the War. Shipping times have increased, freight rates have risen, and insurance premiums have spiked. Countries not involved in the war still face pressure to take sides. This has strained relations with major powers (e.g., EU, China), increased defense spending to hedge against regional instability, and resulted in domestic political polarization over foreign policy alignment

Iran and its proxies have retaliated. There have been alleged Increases in cyberattacks on global banks, infrastructure, and government systems. There is a heightened terrorism alert, resulting in more resources diverted to intelligence and counterterrorism. Terrorist attacks at Old Dominion, a Michigan synagogue, and the theft of four drones may just be the beginning.

Even countries with no troops, no bases, and no direct involvement in the Iran war are paying a price—through higher energy costs, disrupted supply chains, financial instability, and geopolitical pressure. These hidden costs accumulate quietly, but can reshape national budgets, inflation rates, and political landscapes worldwide.

Conclusion

Considering the above discussion, is the cost associated with the Iran War worth the intended result, whatever that goal may be? What about America First? Shouldn’t the money spent on the Iran War be used to support the America First initiative?